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3 Rural Migrant Workers and China's Differential Citizenship

A Comparative Institutional Analysis

In March 2003 a young college-educated man from inland China, who worked in Guangzhou, was detained and tortured to death by local authorities. Personnel from a local detention and deportation station hunted down the victim, Sun Zhigang, on the streets of Guangzhou to face charges of failing to carry an ID card and temporary residence permit. The agents asserted that they were carrying out the state-sanctioned "Measures of Detaining and Repatriating Floating and Begging People in the Cities."¹ The local government covered up the incident until it was reported in the *Southern Metropolis News* (*Nanfang Dushi Bao*) a month later. Other news media rushed to follow the story, and heated discussions on the Internet accelerated the spread of the news. Because the victim was college educated and not an ordinary migrant worker, the tragic event outraged the nation and sent immediate shock waves to the central government. Amid the protests, three brave private lawyers turned in an appeal to the People's Congress requesting a review of the rules' constitutionality.² Within a few months, the State Council annulled the notorious measures and replaced them with a less severe "relief system." Detention and deportation stations across the country were replaced with shelter-style relief houses available to migrants who "choose to stay there."³

The death of Sun Zhigang and the central government's swift response revealed that discrimination against and mistreatment

of migrants had become a grave social problem. During the post-Mao, open-door globalization era, migrants lived in the cities as pariahs or, at best, second-class citizens. The strict household registration (*hukou*) system was a keystone of social control in Mao's era and has remained a pillar of China's political system. The linking of *hukou* and citizenship rights has created tremendous problems for the country. Indeed, today migrants, mostly from rural areas, are still not considered to be citizens of places where they are employed. Migrants' civil rights at a basic level—including the right of movement (or migration) and residence, the right to free choice of employment, the right to place children in urban public schools, due process of law, and so on—are seriously infringed. In addition, the right to equal treatment in the distribution of welfare benefits in the cities where migrants work is also truncated. Although these problems have been widely reported since the early 1990s, the state has not been able to solve them. The truth is that all Chinese citizens are not treated equally despite the fact that the Chinese Constitution guarantees equal and universal protection of all citizens. In practice, citizens and citizen rights are categorized hierarchically according to birthplace, household registration, and employment status. In this chapter, this pattern of segmented and differentiated allocation of citizens' rights and entitlements will be referred to as *differential citizenship*.

Managing internal as well as international migration has always been awkward for developing nations. In the socialist world, the Chinese system of household registration parallels the *propiska* (residence permit system) in the former Soviet Union. The *propiska*, together with an "internal passport," was used to control the flow of migrants into central cities.⁴ The purpose of the "managed migration"—embodying a system of differential resource allocation—is similar to what Dorothy Solinger has found in China, where the urban public goods regime is shored up by way of the *hukou* system.⁵ The *hukou* is at the core of Chinese citizenship rights allocation, without which the state would not have been able to curb rural-to-urban migration; the *hukou* is used to maintain the urban unit (*danwei*) system, to extract agricultural surplus (especially during the high Maoist period), and to enforce rigorous birth control measures (in the reform era), among other policy goals.⁶

In Russia and several successor states of the Soviet Union, the *propiska* has been declared unconstitutional, but in fact it has continued to play an important role. The freedom of migration is seriously infringed

by officials who utilize the *propiska* to control migrants while also making personal fortunes by collecting economic rents. Naturally, this has caused discrimination, bribery, extortion, illegal detention, and state violence.⁷ Likewise, China's *hukou* system has persisted and evolved into an even more complicated matrix of governance during the market transition years. From a comparative perspective, the problems involving Chinese *hukou* are perhaps more intractable and tenacious than those caused by the *propiska*, because in China the huge number of migrants has an impact on almost every aspect of the protected urban regime and challenges the state's social control capacity on a national scale.

The evolution of the "Measures of Detaining and Repatriating" is a case in point. When the decree went into effect in 1982, its original purpose was to repatriate urban homeless citizens back to their hometowns in order to maintain a façade of clean, modern cities. However, as increasingly prosperous cities attracted a huge "floating population" from the countryside, these "peasant workers" injected dynamism into the urban economy while at the same time competing for urban public goods, bringing to a crisis the state's system of providing exclusive benefits to urban residents.⁸ Thus, in 1991 the "Measures of Detaining and Repatriating" were extended to apply to newcomers. Migrants in the cities who did not have ID cards, temporary residence permits, or work permits were constantly at risk of being arrested, detained, and deported back to their home counties. In return for release, many detainees were forced to pay a variety of "fees" (actually ransoms), which local officials took to fill their "little coffers."⁹ The migrants thus became victims of officials' predatory behavior and arbitrary state violence.

The central government is hardly unaware of the problems caused by the *hukou* system. Apparently, the government took advantage of the momentum of the Sun Zhigang incident to remove the "Measures of Detaining and Repatriating." As a matter of fact, since the 1990s the central government has tested various reform proposals. The state adopted measures loosening the rural-to-urban and transprovincial population flows and partially recognized peasant workers as a special form of workers who ought to be subject to the same state regulation and protection as "workers proper"—urban residents holding state-sector jobs—employed in urban units.¹⁰ Ironically, "orderly floating," an official catch phrase since the late 1990s, coincided with soaring social contradictions, precipitated by

the rural-urban divide, the keystone of China's dualistic governance and "emblem of citizenship."¹¹

It is extremely difficult and politically dangerous for the center to change the household registration system in a fundamental way, for it is interlocked with other institutions, such as social insurance and educational system, that define differential citizenship. In addition, localities are often keen on outwardly obeying the center's orders while secretly ignoring them if the orders run against their interests. Given their spatial constraints and limits to providing public goods, it is expected that the large cities would tend to support the existing rural-urban dualism. The cities want migrant labor but also try to preserve the hierarchy of rights and benefits that exclude migrants.

Even a minor change of policy could invite conflict and defiance. Local officials complained that the abolition of the "Measures of Detaining and Repatriating" was inimical to public security. The director of civil affairs in Guangdong Province embraced the center's goals:

The relief house should be opened up, and iron doors and windows should be torn down. No traces of police detention stations or even prisons should be left. The internal management structure should be overhauled. The original detention, discipline, and deportation stations that were modeled after detention houses should be closed, in order to establish a genuine social relief system.¹²

However, he then proceeded to pose security issues:

But some people think it is a hasty move to shift from a policy of detention and deportation to one of relief, and it is necessary to link public security up with detention and deportation. This mentality must be changed. . . . The new rules should have been proposed much earlier. The new policy is human-centered and is designed to protect citizens' personal freedom.¹³

The criticism above clearly shows the difficulties involved in reforming the governance of the migrant population. It is not easy to change the mentality and inertia of the bureaucracy, long relying on *hukou*-centered controls to preserve order and hierarchy. In the wake of Sun Zhigang's death, there have been repeated reports of imminent restructuring of the *hukou* system. In November 2005 the *New York Times* published a

report headlined “China to Drop Urbanite-Peasant Legal Differences.”¹⁴ However, the story made it clear that the changes did not go as far as the headline suggested. It reported only that eleven provinces were experimenting with new measures for granting township and small city *hukou*. Similar stories about fundamental change in the *hukou* system have appeared every few years, but all of them have proved to be rumors or erroneous reports.¹⁵

The Chinese “Post-Speenhamland” Citizenship Transformation

Far from disappearing, the *hukou* system is being retooled for the present era of market liberalization and mobility. Since the late 1990s, the central government has put forward several measures designed to improve the status of peasant migrants in the cities without eliminating the dual structure. These are differentially implemented in the localities. This chapter considers whether the gap between the rights and treatments of various citizens’ groups is widening or narrowing and whether differential citizenship is merely a short-term phenomenon of a transition economy.

The notion of modern citizenship is a good point of departure to explore these questions. In his classical statement, T. H. Marshall used British experience to illustrate modern citizen rights development under market capitalism: from civil rights in the eighteenth century, to political rights in the nineteenth century, finally arriving at social rights in the twentieth century.¹⁶ Although he stated that this pattern of citizenship progression is “dictated by history even more clearly than by logic,”¹⁷ it has been widely accepted that there is a universal logic of citizenship extension from civil to political to social rights along with capitalist development.¹⁸

However, Dorothy Solinger has observed the problem in the Chinese context: “[C]itizenship does not come easily to those outside the political community whose arrival coincides with deepening and unaccustomed marketization. . . . [C]apitalism, rather than promoting citizenship, may be antagonistic and detrimental to it, especially when it appears on the heels of a system of governmentally granted benefits.”¹⁹ The research presented in this chapter tries to ferret out new clues in China’s development of citizenship to dialog with Solinger’s findings and arguments.

In the following sections, I will define the concept of differential citizenship in contrast to that of universal citizenship and provide a mapping

of differentiated citizen groups based on the concept. Next, I will analyze the citizen rights practices in China by comparing migrant groups to other groups, notably urban *hukou* holders. In doing so, I will borrow a few concepts from studies on international migration and apply them to the case of domestic migration. The conclusion, which begins with a revisit of T. H. Marshall's classic thesis of the progression and limits to citizenship universalism, will consider several theoretical implications. The data I use in the article were mostly gathered from fieldwork and in-depth interviews, during 2004–2006, in various places in China, including the Pearl River Delta area, the Greater Shanghai area, and Southern Jiangsu Province.

To begin with the conclusions: First, there is no clear evidence of “devaluation of urban citizenship” in China even though a new group of “denizens” is emerging from the recent *hukou* system readjustments.²⁰ Second, since 1949, China has not merely experienced a “non-linear” development of citizenship rights, but apparently it has also experienced a non-Marshallian path of change, in which the *differentiating principle* serves as a driving force in lieu of the *universalizing principle* widely recognized in the context of typical market capitalist societies.

Finally, China's trajectory of citizenship transformation can be better construed as a pattern of post-Speenhamland transition under current waves of globalization. Pressures under globalization have further forged hierarchies of citizenship rights in China. The use of “post-Speenhamland transition” in this context is a heuristic device for historical-comparative understanding. In Karl Polanyi's groundbreaking work, *The Great Transformation*, the Speenhamland system of poor relief (installed in 1795) was construed as a last-ditch resistance against the advance of industrial capitalism.²¹ The Speenhamland system guaranteed subsistence-level living to the dwellers on poor relief in the countryside. This system authorized a parish to administer relief within its territorial jurisdiction, which hindered the formation of a national labor market.²² Its breakdown therefore facilitated the “free movement” of labor force to the cities and their “right to work” in the manufacturing sector based on a social relation of “contract” rather than “status.”²³ Hence, England in the nineteenth century witnessed an epochal formation of a modern working class.²⁴

In the context of the People's Republic of China (PRC), the commune system (established in 1958), before its complete breakdown in the early 1980s, strictly controlled rural-to-urban migration, paralleling the lega-

cies of the manorial system and the Speenhamland regulation of the movement of labor. The Chinese commune institutions used to guarantee, at least in theory, a minimum livelihood to villagers who were bound to the soil in their hometowns. The rural-urban cleavage hinged on the severe regulation of *hukou* and internal migration; and the legacies of this dualism continue to shape the formation of the migrant working class to this day. In this way, the current post-Mao transformation in China can be interpreted as a case of post-Speenhamland transition in historical comparison.

Differential Citizenship in Action

The interlocking of *hukou* with citizenship rights is the most conspicuous element of China's citizenship system. Several historical-structural factors have contributed to the current system. First, China's rural-urban dualism was created in the 1950s when China collectivized agriculture, nationalized industry, and launched its first Five-Year Plan modeled on the Soviet Union. Dual governance of the population helped to control rural-to-urban migration and to extract agrarian surplus from rural areas by locking the peasants to the soil.²⁵ "The PRC *Hukou* Registration Statute" of 1958, in conjunction with other laws, formally initiated this dualism. But it totally collapsed during the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960) with vast unregulated urban migration. During this brief period, a large number of peasants entered the urban industrial sector, but at the end of the movement, they were repatriated back to the countryside. In the 1960s this policy disaster, combined with the horrendous famine, led the state to lock the dualistic system in place. Since the 1970s, the *hukou* system has been further utilized to enforce a stringent birth-control policy. In addition, widespread local protectionism throughout the country helps to exclude nonnatives from the urban public goods regime. The institutions and practices generated by differential citizenship embody a distinctive marriage of modernity and traditionalism, an expression of China's "communist neotraditionalism," as Andrew Walder phrased it.²⁶

More than a half-century ago, the Chinese social anthropologist Fei Xiaotong coined the term *chaxu geju* (differential mode of association) to interpret social relationships in traditional China.²⁷ The concept of differential citizenship is relevant to Fei's articulation in two ways. First,

China traditionally lacked a system of citizenship granting universal and equal rights for all, as in a typical, modern, Western society. Second, a social relationship is traditionally defined by the distance to, and affiliations with, one's family line and relatives. A consequence of this mode of association is the ambiguity of one's rights and obligations. My approach differs from Fei's on one critical point: because a differential mode of association refers to the "traditional, peasant society," as opposed to "Western society," it suggests certain "pre-modern" and "pre-capitalist" social conditions, though not necessarily with a pejorative connotation.²⁸ Although I have been influenced by Fei's interpretation of Chinese culture, my understanding of differential citizenship is located in a state that has embarked on a modernization campaign to push rapid industrialization.²⁹ I emphasize the fact that the Communist ruling apparatus, a modernizing state, has played and continues to play a pivotal role in creating institutional inequality with its ever-increasing infrastructural power.³⁰ A "status" or "right" ascribed to an individual citizen or social group is superimposed by the state as well as being generated from indigenous social rules. Dual forces exert pressure on underprivileged persons and groups, so that the concept of differential citizenship does not rest simply on a spontaneous social order, as suggested in the notion of "association" by Fei's *chaxu geju* and his English translators. In short, the Communist regime established an institutionalized order that differentiated rural and urban citizen status along lines unseen before 1949.

Proponents of multiculturalism use the term "differentiated citizenship" to describe desirable, special treatments offered to disadvantaged citizen groups.³¹ My usage of differential citizenship, in contrast, connotes a discriminating mechanism both inherent in the social system and imposed by the state. This definition is consistent with what Marshall observed long ago: "Status was not eliminated from the social system. *Differential status*, associated with class, function, and family, was replaced by the single uniform status of citizenship, which provided the foundation of equality on which the structure of inequality could be built."³² The "Western" style of class inequality has emerged from an ideal type of unitary citizenship, whereas in today's China, class inequality is building on a non-single, nonuniform status of citizenship around the *hukou* system.

As defined above, the principle of differential citizenship takes root in both traditional and contemporary China. The institutionalized category

of peasants under the commune system anticipated the emergence of migrant peasant workers (*nongmingong*, or *mingong* for short) during the reform era. *Mingong* literally means “private worker,” in contrast to the urban *state*-employed worker.³³ In a sense, rural migrants in the reform era represent a new, invented social category, given its size and significance in the formation of a new working class, in contrast to the privileged state-sector workers under Mao’s regime.³⁴

Differential citizenship causes a multilayered mechanism in which rural migrant workers are situated at the bottom of the power structure in a locality. Table 3.1 illustrates the patterns of inequality generated by differential citizenship within a typical newly industrialized factory town. The analysis develops from my earlier fieldwork on “Shewei Village” (coded name) in Guangdong. Like many villages undergoing rapid growth and demographic changes in South and East China, Shewei had actually become an industrial town or small city by the mid-1990s.³⁵ There are three categories of inequality operating in the local citizenship regime based on three types of status distinction—urban vs. rural, cadres vs. non-cadres, and native residents vs. nonnative migrants—as shown on the top row of the table. A stratification of socioeconomic groups—cadres and elders, native residents, and migrants—is shown in the left columns. A mark is checked on the intersecting cell where a relative deprivation or differential treatment exists.

ble 3.1 Differential citizenship and hierarchies of status in China’s factory town

		Relative positions of deprivation and disadvantages		
		(A) Cities vis-à-vis countryside	(B) Cadres vis-à-vis non-cadres	(C) Natives vis-à-vis nonnatives
ratification	(1) Cadres and lineage elders	X		
	(2) Native villagers	X	X	
	(3) Migrant peasant workers	X	X	X

The first category (A) is the distinction of rural-urban residency through the *hukou* system, which rigorously regulates rural-to-urban migration and household registration and thus controls conditions of migration, labor, and rights in the cities. The second category (B) is a distinction among native villagers. The state delegates power to rural cadres for the management of collective assets; as a rule, the power is usually grasped by lineage elders or strong families with party ties in the villages. The third category of status differentiation (C) is embodied in the extremely unequal distribution of benefits between native and nonnative residents. This asymmetry is caused essentially by the notion of "collective ownership,"³⁶ a rural counterpart to the urban public goods provision regime. Outsiders without local *hukou* are deemed noncitizens of the village and are therefore ineligible for the benefits provided to natives. This is an important instance of how the collectivist institutions in the Mao period have influenced the market reform era.

Hence, three socioeconomic strata based on the above patterns of differential status can be identified. The first group includes cadres and lineage elders. Sitting at the top of the power hierarchy in the village, this group, disadvantaged only in comparison to the urban state sector, enjoys political and economic superiority through its control of village collective properties, including land and village enterprises. Many "rural entrepreneurs" have emerged through their superior power positions within the community.

A second stratum is composed of non-cadre native villagers. In most instances, they are the nominal "shareholders" of collective ownership and entitled to receive collective benefits, but they lack the power to control collective enterprises. In communities with large numbers of migrants, such as many Guangdong villages, villagers in this category have turned themselves into small landowners or "rentiers" or have left the soil to work as self-employed persons.

The migrant peasant workers occupy the lowest position in the newly industrialized town, just as they do in the city. Legally, they have to apply for a temporary residence permit from the public security bureau in order to be hired, a process usually handled through the factories that employ them. In fact, many migrant workers are not registered with the local authorities and become members of a "ghost population," partly because the factories can save a variety of "head taxes," including social insurance expenses, with the tacit permission of the officials.³⁷ Ironi-

cally, the widespread usage of the term “peasant worker” itself symbolizes an extreme form of “one nation, multiple systems” in the Chinese labor regime. The migrants’ citizen rights are deprived in each of the three layers of the status differentiation. Furthermore, they are physically bound within the factory town by the *hukou* and the public security apparatus, working long hours at minimum wages and under inferior conditions.³⁸

Migrants thus constitute a distinct category of subjects ruled by the state. They are caught in a predicament: they are neither rural nor urban, and neither peasants nor workers, but “peasant workers.” The migrants are citizens (*gongmin*) of the PRC only when they stay in their native places, that is, the place of their *hukou* registration. Once they leave, they are transformed into “aliens” or, more accurately, “alien nationals.”

It should be noted that all three groups fall under the official label of “peasant” in the *hukou* system. All the inequalities generated by the hierarchy of village citizenship and noncitizenship—discrimination, domination, and exploitation—occur within each category. The cadre peasants dominate the non-cadre peasant villagers; native peasants enjoy widespread rights and benefits unavailable to migrant peasant workers. Therefore, the differentiating principle of citizenship, which has evolved along with the emerging market economy, applies not only to the well-known *rural-urban divide*, but also to a *rural-rural divide*. This internal differentiation results in a status hierarchy. By contrast, the universalizing principle of citizenship, a touchstone of the Marshallian historical approach, appears at best feeble in China.

Table 3.2 examines the practices of differential citizenship in urban areas. In lieu of the usual dichotomy of urban citizen/noncitizen, I propose a spectrum ranging from urban citizen to “ghost worker” to capture the significant nuances between the different statuses. The wide range of noncitizens points to the fact that there is a complicated class stratification within the migrant population and that it is a long, bumpy road for a migrant to achieve full urban citizenship, a road that few travel.

Urban Citizens

The above analytical framework shows how the differentiating principle operates within an urban *hukou* regime. Only citizens with urban *hukou*

Table 3.2 Between citizen and ghost worker in China's urban citizenship regimes

Citizen	Denizen	Legal transient	↔	Ghost worker
Full membership	Partial membership	Limited membership		No membership
Native <i>hukou</i> holders, "naturalized" migrants	(a) Blue-seal <i>hukou</i> (<i>lanyin</i>) (b) Long-term residence permit holders (<i>juzhuzheng</i>) (c) Nonnatives temporarily employed in state units	Documented temporary residents (a) Migrant workers living in enclave-like factories (b) Self-employed workers living in slums, ghettos, or "city villages" (<i>chengzhongcun</i>) (c) "vagrants and beggars"		"Illegal," undocumented, or false registered migrants

are entitled to enjoy full urban membership. Native *hukou* holders typically, but not always, constitute the majority of the urban community. During the Mao era, urban citizenship was not a secure and stable status, because people could be sent down to the countryside for "reeducation" during political campaigns, returned to their villages to work during the Great Leap famine, or sent to the Third Front to contribute to the defense infrastructure in mountain and border areas. In each of these instances, they were stripped of their urban *hukou*.³⁹ Such arbitrary infringement of civil rights/*hukou* rights has been lessened in the reform era.

Under the current urban regime, only a small and select group of migrants can obtain full citizenship. These include those immigrants who are employed in urban units and allowed to transfer their *hukou* to the host city, people whose parents were sent down from the city to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution and now reclaim their urban membership as "returnees,"⁴⁰ and people with high skills or special talents who are eligible to be "naturalized" as full members. This group, along with the native residents, constitutes the core of the urban *hukou* regime.

Urban Denizens

A second tier of urban membership is primarily composed of (a) non-natives temporarily employed in the urban state units; (b) blue-seal *hukou* residents; and (c) long-term residence permit holders. I call them *denizens* with partial membership in the urban regime. The significance of the temporary state-sector employees, however, has been waning with the decline of the unit system and the privatization of many state enterprises. The blue-seal system was a product of the Jiang Zemin era, during which an expansionary financial policy and booming real estate market encouraged well-to-do migrants to buy private homes in the cities; the government awarded them a special *hukou* status called *lanyin* (blue seal). A blue-seal resident (similar to a permanent resident status in international migration) can apply for *luohu* (akin to “naturalization”) after a certain period of residency.⁴¹ The system operates like the “commercial immigration” programs in countries such as Canada, where wealthy migrants who invest a certain sum in real estate or enterprises are granted immigrant status. But it should be noted that the blue-seal *hukou* is effective only within the locality where it is issued. In this way, the freedom of migration that a blue-seal holder actually enjoys is limited.⁴² Shanghai granted the blue seal to approximately forty-two thousand people between 1994 and 2001, among whom 88 percent acquired the status through purchase of real estate.⁴³ The central government curbed the blue-seal system in the early 2000s as the real estate bubble burst on a national scale and the blue seal was thought to add fuel to the overheated housing markets.⁴⁴ However, those who had already acquired the blue seal at that point were allowed to retain their status and apply for local *hukou*.⁴⁵

A new long-term residence permit system (*juzhuzheng*) was put into effect in the early 2000s. This new policy has been implemented to varying degrees at the local government level, depending on a locality’s population control target and capacity in public goods provision. Overall, the new system has refocused the granting of urban *hukou* from attracting economic capital to bringing in human capital. As a result, acquiring a full urban membership has become more difficult; being a *nouveau riche* is not sufficient to buy a *hukou* in the central cities under the blue-seal system. Take Shanghai, for example. The city launched a new residence permit policy to facilitate a “soft flow of talented people” in 2002. Eligible

applicants were redefined as "persons with a college diploma or higher education, or persons with special talents."⁴⁶ According to one Shanghai scholar, as of September 2004 approximately fifty thousand people held residence permits.⁴⁷ The new system also paired with a reduction of quotas for naturalization. Only twenty-four thousand people were granted permanent *hukou* (citizens proper) in Shanghai in 2004; the quota was further reduced to twelve thousand in 2005, of which two thousand were reserved for returnees whose parents were intellectuals who had been sent down during the Cultural Revolution.⁴⁸ Notably, due to the rapid expansion of higher education in recent years, Shanghai produces more than thirty thousand college graduates annually; and since 1996, the government has no longer guaranteed urban employment positions to the graduates by assignment. Thus, one can imagine how intensely graduates, many of whom originate outside Shanghai, have been competing with one another for Shanghai *hukou*.

I have adopted the term *denizen* from international migration theory, which defines the word as an extrapolitical member of the community enjoying wide-ranging social and economic rights. In the original context, what distinguishes denizens from citizens is that the former do not or cannot participate in political life as the latter do; usually, there is no significant difference in the domain of civil and social rights.⁴⁹ However, in China, denizens are not granted the franchise even at the grassroots level. Another line separating denizens from citizens is the extent to which new immigrants can receive urban public goods. As a rule, social security coverage and welfare benefits are not as comprehensive for denizens as for citizens.

Compared with migrants on temporary residence status, denizens are *privileged noncitizens*, but the ubiquitous problem of policy uncertainty in China has made the status of denizens vulnerable and less desirable than that of their counterparts in Western Europe and North America. As one Shanghai resident noted:

Even if you find a decent job in Shanghai and get the residence permit (*juzhuzheng*), you are still subject to review regularly, say every three to five years. And it is very likely that when the applicant gets old, the government would not approve the renewal and would force him to return to his hometown. Moreover, there are no compulsory provisions for medi-

cal insurance for them. It is left to the employer. . . . The policy is similar in Shenzhen, but more loosely implemented. All of the problems are caused by local protectionism.⁵⁰

Based on the above findings, we conclude that Chinese urban denizens are at best partial members of the urban regime. Their status as privileged noncitizens is fluid, insecure, and vulnerable. They still have strong motivation to seek formal citizenship, however difficult, because citizen status alone guarantees permanent rights to live in the city. Therefore, in China's local communities we have not observed the phenomenon of "devaluation of (urban) citizenship," as documented in Europe and North America. Urban citizenship remains a precious, highly sought-after good.

Legal Transients—Documented Temporary Residents

Rural migrants occupy a substantial and growing proportion of the population in the developing coastal areas. Shanghai is an example. At the end of 2005, the city hosted about 5.8 million migrants, with a 13.6-million permanent *hukou* population.⁵¹ In other words, 30 percent of the city's total population were migrants. At the end of that same year, in Kunshan, Jiangsu Province, there were 655,000 citizens and 689,000 registered noncitizens;⁵² more than half of the total population were migrants. In the manufacturing region of South China, where the need for laborers is great, the ratio runs much higher. In 2005 in Dongguan, Guangdong Province, 78 percent of the total 7.5-million population came from outside that province.⁵³ A year later, Shenzhen of Guangdong Province accommodated 6.5 million migrants, and the city's *hukou* residents were 1.9 million.⁵⁴ All of the above estimates are based on governmental statistics, which tend to underestimate the numbers of migrants.

By "legal transient," I mean a migrant with the status of documented temporary residence. This status is dissimilar to the urban denizen (blue-seal or long-term residence permit holder) in several ways. First, unlike the more stable residence permit, temporary residence status is short-term, often under constant inspection, and requires regular renewal. Sun Zhigang fits into this category, for when he was arrested on the street for failure to carry an ID card, he had been working legally as a temporary resident in Guangzhou. This incident demonstrates that even a

documented transient may face high risks and official abuse. Second, a denizen has better social security coverage and is entitled to more urban benefits than a temporary resident.

Third, a class line distinguishes many transients from denizens. Although denizens compose a tiny fraction of the emerging middle class, the bulk of transients constitute the new working class. Thus, a gulf exists between denizens and transients in terms of class position and living conditions. If denizens resemble quasi "free citizens," transients represent the *metics* in ancient Greece. Metics, originally referred to as "freed slaves," worked in the Greek polis without the right to become citizens. These non-citizens, or resident aliens, were exposed to dangers because they were a disenfranchised, alienated, and racially defined underclass.⁵⁵ Chinese migrant workers have almost all of the characteristics of the metics, except that they are not racially differentiated. Nonetheless, in principle Chinese urbanites attain urban citizenship on the basis of *jus sanguinis*, so this ethno-cultural foundation for granting urban *hukou*, in conjunction with the traditional pejorative attitude toward peasants, has made "urban Chinese generally view rural Chinese as ethnically distinct."⁵⁶

Yet transients are not a uniform, homogenous social group. There is a fine line among them—the *legality* of their status as transients. Where and for whom a migrant works is not a good indicator of whether one is a "legal" dweller. Migrants may work in foreign- or domestic-owned factories; in the service sector as nannies, waiters, or salesclerks; or at construction sites. They may be self-employed, running small shops or restaurants. Similarly, where they find shelter is also not a good indicator of legal status. To simplify, migrants tend to live in two primary types of housing: (1) enclave-like factory dormitories or densely populated factory towns or (2) urban slums or ghettos, such as Zhejiangcun in Beijing or *mingong dayuan* (migrant slums) that are ubiquitous in many cities.⁵⁷ These categories do not include homeless "vagrants and beggars." An important line between "legal" and "illegal" is whether a migrant has registered with the host government for *temporary residence status* and filed related paperwork. A documented status of temporary residence usually did not make much difference to the migrants during the early years of the reform era, but it has been gaining significance since the late 1990s, when the central government began adopting policies that were intended to improve migrants' working and living conditions. Legal status is no longer trivial, because a documented status now gives access to certain benefits,

however limited. For example, the new social insurance program is designed to provide migrants with retirement pensions, unemployment benefits, health care and injury insurance, and birth subsidies.⁵⁸ However, it should be noted that the social insurance benefits enjoyed by documented transients are significantly less than those enjoyed by denizens.

In addition, the right to move and work is better protected under temporary residence status. During the 1990s, complaints about excessive and irregular fees charged for securing documented status soared. Since the early 2000s, especially following the Sun Zhigang incident, the center has cracked down on official corruption tied to issuing temporary residence cards.⁵⁹ As early as 1999, the Guangdong Provincial People's Congress passed an act that allows a legal migrant to apply for a local permanent *hukou* after seven consecutive years of residence.⁶⁰ Yet, this apparently liberal provision has not attracted a single applicant from among Guangdong's huge migrant population. According to one Guangdong scholar, this is because "no migrant is aware of the existence of the law."⁶¹ A more plausible explanation may be that the red tape facing such a permanent status seeker is too cumbersome and the fees too high.

Compulsory education for migrant children is another domain under reform. China's urban public education systems have long discriminated against migrant children. In the 1990s it was almost impossible for them to enter public schools. These children had to enroll in low-quality and poorly equipped private schools. During that period, the center experimented with ways of encouraging public school enrollment, but in vain. In 2003 the State Council sent local governments an "opinion" on migrant children's education, jointly issued by six central ministries. This document required host governments to allocate funds for migrant children's compulsory education with equal treatment.⁶² In several respects, this new policy was unprecedented in trying to extend education rights to migrants. Most importantly, the policy charged the public schools, which now were no longer allowed to charge extra fees, with an obligation to admit migrant children as long as they held valid documents. However, in practice, today migrants are still reluctant to send their children to public schools. First, many schools continue to charge exorbitant fees for migrant children by creating ingenious categories that circumvent the center's new policy. Second, migrant parents and children are daunted by the prejudices of teachers, classmates, and classmates' parents. Third, there are difficulties with institutional coordination in China's complicated and

segmented education system, which is based on the principle of territorial jurisdiction. In general, migrant children must return to their *hukou* hometowns for education beyond junior high school. At the same time, because textbooks at guest schools differ from those in their hometowns, parents fear this might add to the burden of preparing for senior high school entrance exams.⁶³

In July 2008 the State Council sent down a new document, demanding that migrant-receiving local governments provide free and accessible compulsory education to all migrant children who are legally registered.⁶⁴ Yet, the actual effects of this new policy announcement need to be watched closely in the coming years.

Ghost Workers: Undocumented Migrants

Registered migrants belong to the group with limited urban membership and are supposedly covered with minimal social insurance, whereas undocumented migrants enjoy no urban membership rights. They are invisible on official dossiers and statistical yearbooks; they are not participants in the social security system; and they are truly mobile and fluid, as suggested by government classification of them as the "floating population." They are like "ghosts" haunting the skies above and the earth beneath China's booming cities.

Huge numbers of undocumented migrants live and work in the prosperous coastal cities. For instance, from 2004 to 2005, an estimated 2.4 million undocumented migrants⁶⁵ and 5.8 million documented migrants lived in Shanghai.⁶⁶ In Dongguan, fewer than half of the total migrant population (estimated at 5 to 6 million) was registered with local authorities between 2001 and 2002.⁶⁷ In Shenzhen, 36 percent of the 10 million migrants were unregistered in 2005.⁶⁸ It is no exaggeration to infer that ghost workers have played a major role in China's industrial development. The above figures clearly show the magnitude of the undocumented migrant population. They also point to the unreliability of using official statistical yearbooks to calculate the number of migrants.

Two points should be noted. First, the boundary between "legal" and "illegal" transients is not as clear-cut as that between transients in general and denizens. There is ample space for these two categories to overlap. The distinction between transients and denizens is primarily a class difference, although that between legal and illegal transients is more tactical

than class-based. Many migrants deliberately misinform their employers or local authorities. In the same vein, employers and local officials often hide real numbers, for economic reasons or other motivations.⁶⁹

Second, “illegal,” undocumented, or falsely registered migrants are the most alienated of the urban alien nationals. Bereft of all state benefits, including social security, their status makes them vulnerable to merciless exploitation, bribery demands, and other abuse by officials. Table 3.3 provides a sketch of the differential citizenship rights and treatments in a local community. I call it a “Marshallian checklist” for historical as well as cross-societal comparison. In this Chinese context, the category of urban citizens is taken as a benchmark or ideal for comparison because it represents the best attainable treatment offered to Chinese citizens. Undocumented ghost workers sit at the bottom in every aspect of citizenship rights.

Dialectics of Pure Transiency

Given the above considerations, we should not overlook the Janus-faced situation of undocumented migrants. Certainly, illegal status may expose a migrant to imminent dangers, but, as is evident in Sun Zhigang’s case, even a person with legal status could face fatal abuse. Bureaucracies can, of course, easily find fault with even legal transients. Therefore, transiency is essentially a fluid situation, rather than a fixed identity; and urban noncitizens may even take advantage of transiency under certain circumstances. First, ghost workers, hiding information from local authorities, can escape surveillance and corrupt demands. For example, many female migrants have shunned pregnancy tests. Being invisible can shield one from perils as well as deny one benefits.

Second, migrants may use fake IDs to enter the labor market. “ID services” (*banzheng*) are ubiquitous in China today, especially in urban slums or suburban factory towns that are densely populated by migrants. It is easy to obtain fake IDs, diplomas, certificates, or licenses, all of which a newcomer needs in order to pass the urban gate.

Third, the use of fake documents has had an important effect on social security. In field interviews, I often hear complaints by employers that migrant workers themselves do not want to participate in the social insurance program. This seems not entirely a pretense. Migrant informants explain: “If I can’t stay here for a long time, I can’t take the personal account

Table 3.3 A Marshallian checklist of differential citizenship rights in a local urban polity in China

	Citizen	Denizen	Legal transient	Ghost
Civil rights	Freedom of residence and occupation basically protected	Freedom of residence and occupation basically protected	Freedom of residence and occupation partially protected	Seriously deprived; exposed to official abuse
Political rights	Eligible to participate in grassroots—level elections	None	None	None
Social rights	Complete coverage of welfare benefits	Access to more or less complete coverage of welfare benefits	Partially covered with lesser benefits; urban public goods provided with higher prices	None

(of the retirement pension) with me when I leave the factory.” In short, the insured’s personal account does not migrate with the migrant, especially in the case of transprovincial movement.⁷⁰ Migrants in general do not trust the government because of policy uncertainty. Thus many decline insurance in order to save their portion of the contribution. Of course, this is welcomed by employers. Exploring deeper, I found that many uninsured workers used fake IDs or did not apply for temporary residence so they were by default excluded from the umbrella of the urban citizenship regime.

Above all, a central issue is how migrants enter the urban labor market and with what status. Ghost workers are elusive because, unlike the registered transients, they cannot be pinned down easily by the state surveillance apparatus. They are “unregulated” by the government and “really free,” without even a temporary residence status. In this sense, they are purely transient—invisible, unruly, and ungovernable.

Theoretical Implications

It is time to bring T. H. Marshall back into the arena of domestic migration. Students of international migration have applied his ideas to immigration studies. Recently, a debate has grown about the applicability of his concepts to the current world system under globalization. For example, “immigration is one reason why Marshallian citizenship universalism is no longer plausible today.”⁷¹ In the literature of international migration, the contemporary Marshall is forced to deal with the problem of closure and exclusion by the citizenship mechanism across national borders. By contrast, the classical Marshall was concerned with the evolution of citizenship within the boundaries of a nation-state tackling the issue of “how citizenship, and other forces outside it, have been altering the pattern of social inequality.”⁷² Problems of social inequality and domestic migration in China make it necessary to revisit Marshall’s ideas.

Marshall made the classical statement about the progression and limits of citizenship universalism more than a half-century ago. His original observation on British development of citizenship rights remains a valid point of reference for this research. Modern citizenship presupposed a new form of contract between free and equal subjects, which was a departure from feudal status institutions. Universalism has established itself as

a principle, at least ideally within the liberal circle, for the advocacy of citizenship and democracy since the nineteenth century.

Citing H. S. Main, Marshall argued that in the early stage of modern citizenship development, the single uniform status of citizenship “was clearly an aid, and not a menace to, capitalism and the free-market economy, because it was dominated by civil rights, which confer the legal capacity to strive for the things one would like to possess but do not guarantee the possession of any of them.”⁷³ Contrary to a common reading of Marshall, that he wholeheartedly espoused a unilinear, progressive perspective of citizenship development under the rise of market capitalism—from civil to political to social rights—Marshall *did* reflect on the problem of formalism in civil rights, especially freedom of speech and property rights. True, he recounted the development of citizenship from the seventeenth to the twentieth centuries in an orderly, even linear fashion.⁷⁴ Nevertheless, he unequivocally stated that “blatant inequalities are not due to defects in civil rights, but to *lack of social rights*, and social rights in the mid-nineteenth century were in the doldrums.”⁷⁵ Lack of social rights makes civil rights a void doctrine. As yet, the lack of civil rights (particularly the *hukou*-centered infringements of rights) makes social rights unattainable to most Chinese migrant workers.

Valuable Urban Membership under Differential Citizenship

Drawing on Marshall's classical argument and the findings of my research, I propose several points with theoretical implications. First, what has distinguished China's development of modern citizenship from that prevailing in most Western countries is the *differentiating principle of citizen status and rights*. A single uniform status of citizenship did not exist in the Mao era.⁷⁶ Nor has it established itself during the subsequent market transition. On the contrary, Chinese capitalism has been thriving in the soil of differential citizenship and “a system of governmentally granted benefits,” which in turn has aggravated social inequalities and systematic bias against underprivileged citizen groups. Solinger has observed that “through the mid-1990s it was official policy that ‘citizens’ not in possession of a local *hukou* were to be prevented from receiving urban public goods.”⁷⁷ Although the state has tried to improve its infrastructural capacity in providing public goods, and more migrants are now granted limited access to the urban public goods regime, the structural

inequality caused by the interlocking of *hukou* and citizenship has not changed in any fundamental way. In addition, the principle of territorial jurisdiction on *hukou* has continued to be an unrelenting force in local governance. The state is merely ameliorating the problem on the surface, leaving intact the fundamental pattern of inequality.

Therefore, I observe no clear indication of “urban citizenship devaluation” in China, in contrast to the postnational membership in the European context.⁷⁸ Urban citizenship, particularly in the major cities, is still a precious good under intense competition. As one Chinese sociologist points out:

The *huji* [that is, *hukou*] system has been loosened since the 1980s, but as the phasing out of the old ‘unit system’ and consequently the retreat of its social integration function, the *huji* status is becoming more significant to the social members, particularly to the urban dwellers. Under the old unit system, [a small number of] agricultural *hukou* holders were allowed to enter the urban enterprises and acquire corresponding unit membership and occupational status. However, the current immigrants are basically excluded from the urban organizational system, and they enter the urban labor market as cheap laborers.⁷⁹

Furthermore, the term “peasant worker” has become a distinct social category. It is reproducing itself in social practice and in public life so effectively as to create a “hereditary status effect”—the term “peasant worker’s children” has been adopted as an official category in public policy.⁸⁰ This category serves to legitimize government differential treatment. Inequality thus reproduces itself through official categories.⁸¹

Non-Marshallian Path of Change and Beyond

Since the late 1990s, the central government has advocated a policy of “orderly floating” and has begun to recognize migrant workers as “a new form of labor army, emerging from China’s advance toward open reform, industrialization, and urbanization,” on the condition that their rural *hukou* remain unchanged.⁸² At the same time, there have been changes in the urban regime on two fronts: On the one hand, urban citizens who were accustomed to privileged distribution of public goods now have to accept the discipline of the “market.” The state has significantly withdrawn from the social welfare sphere and allowed market forces to march into it,

particularly in housing and medical care. On the other hand, migrants who have long been excluded from the urban regime are now granted a few opportunities of becoming denizens or offered access to a shoddy version of the social security program. What is the significance of the state's retreat from welfare benefits in the state sector, alongside a strategy of piecemeal incorporation of nonurban citizens into social security? This question leads to another important observation on China in historical perspective.

During the Mao years, China experienced a non-Marshallian path of change. The urban sector was securely protected and controlled by a Soviet-style, quasi-Bismarckian welfare system. It guaranteed basic social rights to urbanites through the "unit system." Meanwhile, in the vast countryside, a minimum level of social security was arranged by the commune system. The "five guarantees" provided a pittance for the poorest.⁸³ But most relied on their own and family earnings, and retirement was out of the question. And the number and types of available welfare resources depended on the prosperity of the village as well as on local decisions about allocation. In both sectors, civil liberties were severely restricted and political participation primarily meant state mobilization for mass struggles against class enemies or for leap-forward movements.

The post-Mao transition has fashioned a slow, incremental, yet uncertain expansion of civil rights, particularly the rights to speak, work, and migrate. Note that many of these rights have not been sanctioned by the state, but have mostly been achieved by the rural population through unorganized collective actions such as the influx of migrant workers into townships and cities, which has forced the government to acquiesce or accommodate. The fragmented authoritarian regime is indeed on the defensive. Migrants are good at using the weapons of the weak. They know how to evade population control policies by taking advantage of the segmented structure of the territorial jurisdiction system. There is no doubt that the Chinese people now enjoy a measure of *de facto* freedom from the state unseen in the Mao era. However, the withering of the state welfare system and rampant market forces are making a twist of the progress in citizenship rights. Will the rise of a market economy in China eventually give birth to universalistic citizenship?

There is no clear sign that universal citizenship in China is following a linear development. Quite the contrary, differential patterns of citizenship appear to be creeping into, and even dovetailing with, the marketized

urban regime. As Western history demonstrates, lack of social rights makes civil rights a void doctrine. Here is a paradox of the Chinese case: Under the multiple trends of uncertain, unsteady expansion of civil liberties under a seemingly resilient authoritarian regime,⁸⁴ rampant state-bureaucratic capitalism, and unwieldy globalized market forces, will China experience one more time the Marshallian path of change in human history, if the nation is able to overcome the legacies of differential citizenship?

I will try to clarify the problem from a historical-comparative perspective. The *hukou* problem lies at the heart of any meaningful transformation. The huge pressures of China's enormous population are an inescapable precondition, and China's demographic structure profoundly shapes the postsocialist context in distinctive ways. A brief comparison with Soviet Union/Russia will suffice.

In 1988, a few years before the Soviet Union disintegrated, the first sector (agriculture and forestry) constituted 20 percent of the total labor force; the second sector (industry and construction) 38 percent; and the third sector (transportation, communications, distribution, and other service jobs) 42 percent. In the same year, two-thirds of total population lived in towns and cities.⁸⁵ The Soviet Union had long become an industrialized and urbanized country before its successor states embarked on "capitalist revolution" in the early 1990s.

In comparison, in 1978, on the eve of China's market reform, the first sector constituted 70.5 percent of the labor force; the second sector 17.3 percent; and the third sector 12.2 percent. In 1982, 20.6 percent of total population lived in towns and cities. China was still an agrarian nation. After twenty-five years of market transition, 49 percent of the total labor force was still employed in agriculture in 2003; two years later, 43 percent of the total population lived in towns and cities.⁸⁶ In terms of urbanization, China in the late 1970s approximated the Soviet Union in 1917, the year of the Communist revolution; China today is slightly behind the level of Soviet urbanization in 1961. In terms of employment, China is still less industrialized than the Soviet Union was in 1989. The numbers tell us several things. First, although China and Russia are in the midst of similar postsocialist transitions, the structural characteristics respectively appear to be divergent. Russia faces an institutional transition from a socialist system to a capitalist system, whereas the Chinese state is simultaneously facing two issues: industrialization and urbanization, and an uncertain institutional transformation. Second, although both countries

have encountered the problems of domestic migration and both have adopted similar controls, Chinese *hukou* reform is profoundly difficult from an institutional perspective. Third, Russia had formed a modern labor force before it joined the global capitalist game, but China is enduring an unprecedented, demographic shift in a squeezed time-space transformation. The issue of labor force formation in the postsocialist context leads to my final point.

China's Post-Speenhamland Transition under Globalization

It might be tempting to argue that the Chinese state's withdrawal from the welfare sphere parallels the current neoliberal developments of Western market economies and coincides with new waves of globalization. However, macro-historical comparisons suggest otherwise. Given China's structural characteristics, the nation is undergoing a process of modern working-class formation with semi-feudal characteristics, as the state-employed labor force steadily phases out and an army of rural migrant workers arises. If this interpretation is plausible, then it appears that China is striding on a path comparable to that of early Western capitalism, in which a Polanyian "fictitious labor market" is being manufactured on a national scale. Consequently, China's trajectory of citizenship transformation can be construed as a Chinese version of a post-Speenhamland transition under current waves of globalization. Over the last three decades, global restructuring in division of labor has made China the world's new "manufacturing center," which has required a huge cheap and disciplined labor force. The dismantling of the commune system and the loosened migration controls came in time to "free" the "socialist serfs" and shoveled them into the urban sector.⁸⁷

Incorporation in the globalized market coincides with a discriminatory treatment of migrant workers under conditions of differential citizenship. The differentiating principle in the allocation of citizen rights, with the *hukou* system as its core, is used by central and local governments and beneficiaries of the urban regime as a defense against the demands of aspiring migrant workers. In essence, globalization helps forge hierarchies of citizenship rights in China.⁸⁸

Therefore, differential citizenship is both a precondition and a by-product of China's road to capitalism. A category of "alien nationals" must be created and contained in the *hukou* system to promote "primitive ac-

cumulation.” Chinese peasants now have the right to move, entering the cities and becoming peasant workers, or metics, without adequate welfare protection. In the short run and on the system level, there seems no feasible way for the state to solve the *hukou* problem. This explains why the State Council unequivocally recognized the migrant workers as an important labor force but fell short of securing for them the full rights of urban citizens.⁸⁹

China’s current industrialization, arguably, is the second great world transformation since the English Industrial Revolution. Viewed through Marshallian eyes, advocating a single uniform status of citizenship is “clearly an aid, and not a menace to, [good] capitalism and the [genuinely] free-market economy.”

- all of “new factories and trading firms were private enterprises, and almost all of the capital invested in industry came from local sources.” See Grove, *A Chinese Economic Revolution*, 4.
81. Zou Bing, *Xiao chengzhen de zhidu bianqian yu zhengce fenxi*, 164.
 82. Ibid.
 83. Bozhong Li, *Agricultural Development in Jiangnan, 1620–1850* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1998), 171–172.
 84. Hanchao Lu, *Beyond the Neon Lights*, 3–8.
 85. One may note that the nostalgia for old Shanghai that held sway in the city at the turn of the twenty-first century was not only about Shanghai’s celebrated cosmopolitanism in the Republican era but also about the city’s ability to care for certain small-town lifestyle; see Hanchao Lu, “Nostalgia for the Future: The Resurgence of an Alienated Culture in China,” *Pacific Affairs* 75 (2002): 169–186.
 86. Ebenezer Howard, *Garden Cities of To-Morrow* (London: Faber and Faber, 1946), 46–47.
 87. Ibid., 67–68.
 88. See Norton Ginsburg, Bruce Koppel, and T. G. McGee, eds., *The Extended Metropolis: Settlement Transition in Asia* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1991).
 89. Fu Chonglan, *Xiao chengzhen lun*, 15.
 90. See, for example, a sociological study of three towns located in north China, central China, and the Yangzi River Delta, respectively, found a resurgence of traditional festivals and leisure activities in each of the towns; see Richard J. R. Kirkby, Ian K. Bradbury, and Guanbao Shen, eds., *Small Town China: Governance, Economy, Environment and Lifestyle in Three Zhen* (Surrey, England: Ashgate Pub. Ltd., 2001), 57–58, 99–103, 138–142.
 91. *Shijie zhouban* [Supplement to World Journal], no. 1191 (Jan. 14–Jan. 20, 2007; New York): 54–56.
 92. See Peter Hall and Colin Ward, *Sociable Cities: The Legacy of Ebenezer Howard* (Seattle: Academy Press, 1999), especially Chap. 2.

3. Rural Migrant Workers and China’s Differential Citizenship

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1. This decree was put into effect by the State Council in 1982.
2. See Teng Biao, “Constitutional Review that should not be circumvented,” <http://www.huayilawyers.com/Website/index.php?ChannelID=9&NewsID=270> (accessed February 10, 2006).

3. "Rules for Relief and Management of Vagrants and Beggars in the Urban Area," put into effect in August 2003. See, however, the discussion in this volume's Chapter 15 by Fei-Ling Wang of the case of Sun Zhigang and the subsequent tightening of controls over migrants in the years after 2003. See <http://www1.people.com.cn/GB/shizheng/1026/1923232.html> (accessed January 18, 2006).
4. See Mervyn Matthews, *The Passport Society: Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).
5. See Dorothy Solinger, *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 33–34.
6. For studies on the interrelationships between *hukou* and migration control in China, see Lincoln Day and Ma Xia, eds., *Migration and Urbanization in China* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1994); Alice Goldstein, Michael White, and Sidney Goldstein, "Migration, Fertility, and State Policy in Hubei Province, China," *Demography* 34, no. 4 (1997): 481–491; Kam Wing Chan and Li Zhang, "The *Hukou* System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and Changes," *China Quarterly* 160 (December 1999): 818–855; Delia Davin, *Internal Migration in Contemporary China* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999); Tyrene White, "Domination, Resistance and Accommodation in China's One-Child Campaign," in Elizabeth J. Perry and Mark Selden, eds., *Chinese Society: Change, Conflict and Resistance* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), 183–203; Fei-Ling Wang, "Reformed Migration Control and New Targeted People: China's *Hukou* System in the 2000s," *China Quarterly* 177 (2004); and Fei-Ling Wang, *Organizing through Division and Exclusion: China's Hukou System* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005).
7. For reports and studies on the *propiska* regime's persistence, see Susan Brazier, "Propiska," <http://www.nelegal.net/articles/propiska.htm> (accessed February 16, 2006); Cynthia Buckley, "The Myth of Managed Migration: Migration Control and Market in the Soviet Period," *Slavic Review* 54, 4 (1995): 896–916; Human Rights Watch, Europe and Central Asia Division, 1998, "The Residence Permit System (Propiska)," http://www.hrw.org/reports98/russia/srusstest-04.htm#P284_66713 (1998; accessed February 16, 2006); Noah Rubins, "The Demise and Resurrection of the Propiska: Freedom of Movement in the Russian Federation," *Harvard International Law Journal* 39, no. 2 (1998): 545–566; Roman Wronowycz, "Constitutional Court strikes down internal passport system," *Ukrainian Weekly* 69, no. 47 (November 25, 2001); Damian S. Schaible, "Life in Russia's Closed City: Moscow's Movement Restrictions and the Rule of Law," *New York University Law Review* 76 (2001): 344–373; and WLSP (Westerner Living in St. Petersburg), "Propiska system" (July 5, 2005), <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/9193-8.cfm> (accessed February 16, 2006).
8. See Solinger, *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China*.

9. The extrabudgetary fees include “living expenses in the detention station,” “deportation fees,” and “fees for increasing urban accommodation,” and so on. This is strikingly similar to the post-Soviet Union states, as reported by Human Rights Watch, where the residency permit system provides ample opportunities for police corruption. See Human Rights Watch, Europe and Central Asia Division, 1998, “The Residence Permit System (Propiska).”
10. This is according to the “Labor Law” enacted in 1994. For another instance, the Ministry of Labor promulgated “Temporary Regulations for the Management of Transprovincial Movement of Rural Laborers” in the same year. See Tan Shen, “Wailaigong de Zhuyao Wenti” [Major issues of the migrant workers], *Zhongguo Shehuixue Wang* [Chinese Sociological Net], 2004, http://www.sociology.cass.net.cn/shxw/shld/t20040913_2704.htm (accessed January 15, 2008). See also Fei-Ling Wang’s chapter, in this volume, Chapter 15.
11. Solinger, *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China*, 3; cf. also Lei Guang, “Reconstituting the Rural-Urban Divide: Peasant Migration and the Rise of ‘Orderly Migration’ in Contemporary China,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 10, no. 28 (2001): 471–493.
12. Quoted from *Southern Metropolis News*, June 25, 2003.
13. Quoted from *Southern Metropolis News*, June 25, 2003.
14. Reported by Joseph Kahn in the *New York Times*, November 3, 2005.
15. For another example, the *Wall Street Journal* reported in 1994 that the central government would soon tear down the two-tier *hukou* system. See Li Zhang, *Strangers in the City: Reconfigurations of Space, Power, and Social Networks within China’s Floating Population* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001), 219.
16. See T. H. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class” (originally published in 1939), in Bryan S. Turner and Peter Hamilton, ed., *Citizenship: Critical Concepts* (London: Routledge, 1994).
17. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class,” 9.
18. See Albert O. Hirschman, *The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), Chap. 1.
19. Solinger, *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China*, 1, 278.
20. For the concept of “devaluation of citizenship,” see Peter Schuck, “Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American Citizenship,” in Rogers Brubaker, ed., *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999), 51–65; and Rogers Brubaker, “Membership without Citizenship: The Economic and Social Rights of Noncitizens,” in Rogers Brubaker, ed., *Immigration and the Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999), 145–162. For the concept of “denizen,” see Tomas Hammar, “State, Nation, and Dual Citizenship,” in Rogers Brubaker, ed., *Immigration and Politics of Citizenship in Europe and North America* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1999), 81–96.

21. Karl Polanyi, *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), 77–102.
22. Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, 77–78. Cf. Zhou Hung, “Cong ‘Shudiguanli’ dao ‘Pujixing Tizhi’” [From “Territorial Jurisdiction” to “Universalism Principle”], *Zhongguo Shehui Baozhang* [Chinese Social Security], 8 (2003).
23. Cf. Marshall’s explication, “Citizenship and Social Class,” 14–15, 19–20.
24. The Speenhamland Law was formally replaced by the new Poor Law in 1834. The new law required that all poor relief should be nationally administered. See Polanyi, *The Great Transformation*, 101–102.
25. Cf. Tiejun Cheng and Mark Selden “The Origins and Social Consequences of China’s *Hukou* System,” *China Quarterly* 139 (1994): 646–668.
26. Andrew Walder, *Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986).
27. For the concept of *chaxu geju*, see Fei Xiao-tong, *Xiangtu Zhongguo* [Peasant China] (Hong Kong: Sanlian Chubanshe, 1991 [1947]). I took the translation from Gary Hamilton and Wang Zheng, “Introduction,” in Hamilton and Zheng, *From the Soil: The Foundations of Chinese Society: A Translation of Fei Xiaotong’s Xiangtu Zhongguo* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 19–20. This translation is paired with another term of Fei’s, that is, *tuanti geju* (organizational mode of association), which is regarded as the organizing principle of Western societies.
28. Cf. Jeffrey Sachs, Wing Thyee Woo, and Xiaokai Yang’s interpretation of my earlier fieldwork: the Chinese way of industrial development has carried a style of feudal institutional legacies. See Sachs, Woo, and Yang, “Economic Reforms and Constitutional Transition,” Social Science Research Network Electronic Paper Collection (October 2000), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=254110 (accessed August 8, 2008).
29. For example, the rural-urban divide and industrial-agricultural dualism helped the state to extract surplus for industrialization and to control the society. See Chih-Ming Ka and Mark Selden, “Original Accumulation, Equity and Late Industrialization: The Cases of Socialist China and Capitalist Taiwan,” *World Development* 14, no. 10–11 (1986): 1293–1310.
30. For the concept of infrastructural power, see Michael Mann, “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results,” *Archives europeennes de sociologie* 25 (1984): 185–213. For the “statist choices” aimed at controlling population movement, see also Dorothy Solinger, “Citizenship Issues in China’s Internal Migration: Comparisons with Germany and Japan,” *Political Science Quarterly* 144, no. 3 (1999): 455–478.
31. Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, “Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies: Issues, Contexts, Concepts,” in Will Kymlicka and Wayne Norman, eds., *Citizenship in Diverse Societies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 1–41.
32. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class,” 20. Emphasis added.

33. Actually, the term “*mingong* workers” was already used in Mao’s time to refer to those urbanites who were employed in the industrial sector without fully state-sanctioned industrial citizenship—that is, to refer to “temporary workers” who lacked state benefits such as pensions and health care. Cf. Martin King Whyte, *Small Groups and Political Rituals in China* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974).
34. See also Wang Feng’s chapter, Chapter 10, in this volume.
35. At the end of 1993, Shewei had a local population of 1,860 people in 495 households, while hosting more than 20,000 migrants working and living in 115 foreign-invested factories. See Wu Jieh-min, “Yazha Renxing Kongjian: Shenfen Chaxu yu Zhongguoshi Duochong Boxue” [Human Space Squeezed: Differential Status and Chinese Style of Multiple Exploitation], *Taiwan Shehui Yanjiu Jikan* [Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies], no. 39 (2000): 1–44.
36. The village assets, including lands, belong to all villagers as a collectivity, and non-villagers are naturally excluded from the collective benefits. According to The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 10, Item 2, “The land of rural and suburban area . . . belongs to the collective; the land used for housing and individual farming . . . also belongs to the collective.” The Land Administration Law of the PRC, Article 8, states, “Collectively-owned land . . . should be managed and regulated by collective agricultural organizations such as the village producer’s cooperatives or villagers committee.” These set up a system of rural ownership at the level of administrative village. In addition, according to The Township and Village Enterprises Law, Article 10, “the property rights of the rural enterprises belong to the entire laborers of the rural community.”
37. For instance, I found a foreign-invested factory in a Guangdong village that employed 1,700 workers but only registered 1,100 migrant workers with the public security bureau in order to save the “head taxes.” This practice has remained widespread, based on my field interviews in East and South China over the last several years. For the negotiable “head tax” and its institutional basis, see Wu Jieh-min, “Strange Bedfellows: Dynamics of Government-Business Relations between Chinese Local Authorities and Taiwanese Investors,” *Journal of Contemporary China* 6, no. 15 (1997): 319–346.
38. See also Anita Chan, *China’s Workers under Assault: The Exploitation of Labor in Globalizing Economy* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001).
39. Cf. Bin Wong, “Citizenship in Chinese History,” in Michael Hanagan and Charles Tilly, eds., *Extending Citizenship, Reconfiguring States* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1999), 97–122.
40. According to the earlier laws, children should inherit their rural or urban *hukou* status through the maternal line. Cf. Sulamith Potter, “The Position of Peasants in Modern China’s Social Order,” *Modern China* 9 (1983): 465–499. This rule effectively prevented the enormous number of “returnees” from going back to their fathers’ home cities. It was abolished in 1988 and the children born since then

have been allowed to claim their own *hukou* status through either the maternal or the paternal line.

41. One of the earliest national policy announcements about the blue seal can be found in “Notice regarding implementing city and township residents *hukou* effective within the local jurisdiction,” issued by the Ministry of Public Security in 1992. See Cao Jingchun, “Guanyu Lanyin Hukou Wenti de Sikao” [Thoughts about the Blue-seal *Hukou*], *Renkou yu Jingji* [Population and Economy], no. 6 (2001): 15–21. Cf. also L. Wong and W. P. Huen, “Reforming the Household Registration System: A Preliminary Glimpse of the Blue Chip Household Registration System in Shanghai and Shenzhen,” *International Migration Review*, no. 32 (1998): 974–994. Municipal cities such as Shanghai promulgated “Shanghai Municipality temporary provisions for the management of blue-seal *hukou*” in February 1994. These provisions were modified in 1998 to further encourage investment-type migration and stimulate the real estate market. See <http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2316/node2341/node2577/userobject6ai496.html> (accessed January 2, 2006).
42. Cao Jingchun, ““Guanyu Lanyin Hukou Wenti de Sikao.”
43. Liu Yingfeng, “Zhongguo Lanyin Huji Zhidu de Qiyuan yu Bianqian” [Origins and Changes of the Blue-seal *Hukou* System], Master’s thesis, Institute of Sociology, National Tsing Hua University, Taiwan (2008), 32, Table 3-3.
44. Liu Yingfeng, ““Zhongguo Lanyin Huji Zhidu de Qiyuan yu Bianqian,” 14–20.
45. For example, the Shanghai Municipal Government ceased issuing blue-seal *hukou* in April 2002 and stated that “the existing preconditions and number of applicants for the blue seal do not correspond with the total amount control target of the permanent residents, and thus have caused a series of negative effects on the city’s economic and social development.” Notice that Shanghai ceases to admit blue-seal *hukou* issued by Shanghai Public Security Bureau, March 2002), see <http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2316/node2329/node2487/userobject6ai1094.html> (accessed January 2, 2006).
46. “Temporary provisions for ‘Shanghai Municipality residence permit system’ for introducing talented persons,” 2002, see <http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node3124/node3125/node3130/userobject6ai1122.html> (accessed June 21, 2009); and “Temporary provisions for Shanghai Municipality residence permit system,” 2004, see http://www.chinacourt.org/flwk/show1.php?file_id=96219 (accessed June 21, 2009).
47. Chen Yingfang, “‘Nongmingong’: Zhidu Anpai yu Shenfen Rentong” [“Peasant Workers”: Institutional Arrangements and Identity], *Shehuixue Yanjiu* [Sociological Research], no. 3 (2005): 119–132.
48. Data collected from field interviews in August 2005.
49. According to Rogers Brubaker, in the European context, legal immigrants—denizens—as such are not inclined to obtain citizenship, because they are almost fully covered by the welfare programs offered to the citizens, except in the

- “political sphere” (voting rights) and getting jobs in public service. See Brubaker, “Membership without Citizenship: The Economic and Social Rights of Noncitizens.” See also Hammar, “State, Nation, and Dual Citizenship”; and Christian Joppke, “How Immigration is Changing Citizenship: A Comparative View,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22, no. 4 (1999): 629–652.
50. Field interview in August 2005. According to Article 4 of Temporary provisions for Shanghai Municipality residence permit system, 2004, the residence permit is valid for one, three, or five years, respectively.
 51. *Shanghai Tongji Nianjian* 2005 [Shanghai Statistical Yearbook 2005], 68, 74.
 52. *Kunshan Tongji Nianjian* 2006 [Kunshan Statistical Yearbook 2006], 47, 49.
 53. *Dongguan Shehuijingji he Shehuifazhan Tongji Gongbao*, 2005 [Bulletin of National Economy and Social Development of Dongguan, 2005].
 54. *Shenzhen Shi Shehuijingji he Shehuifazhan Tongji Gongbao*, 2006 [Bulletin of National Economy and Social Development of Shenzhen City, 2006].
 55. Kymlicka and Norman, “Citizenship in Culturally Diverse Societies.”
 56. Solinger, “Citizenship Issues in China’s Internal Migration: Comparisons with Germany and Japan,” 456.
 57. For the case of Zhejiangcun, see Li Zhang, *Strangers in the City: Reconfigurations of Space, Power, and Social Networks within China’s Floating Population* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001).
 58. See the discussion of these reforms in Chapter 15 of this volume by Fei-Ling Wang.
 59. In October 2001, the State Planning Council and Ministry of Finance sent down a document in curbing the corruptive and rent-seeking behavior through issuing various certificates. In March 2005, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security further abolished several outdated rules and provisions about controlling the free flow of migrants.
 60. Article 17, Management of Floating Population Statute in Guangdong Province. See http://dangan.jianghai.gov.cn/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=12226 (accessed June 21, 2009).
 61. See a report on *Yangcheng Wanbao* [Yangcheng Evening News] by Zhou Min, “Zhanzhuzheng Jiujing Gaixiang Hechuqu?” [Whither the Temporary Residence Card?], October 17, 2002, in <http://www.chinanews.com.cn/2002-12-17/26/254459.html> (accessed March 30, 2006).
 62. “Opinion regarding the further improvement of peasant workers’ children compulsory education,” document forwarded by the State Council, October 1, 2003.
 63. Field interviews in Shanghai, August 2005.
 64. Reported on Xinhua Wang [Xinhua Net], July 30, 2008, http://news.xinhuanet.com/edu/2008-07/30/content_8858472.htm (accessed August 30, 2008).
 65. Chen Yingfang, “‘Nongmingong’: Zhidu Anpai yu Shenfen Rentong.”
 66. *Shanghai Statistical Yearbook* 2005, 68.
 67. Zhou Min, “Whither the Temporary Residence Card?”

68. According to *Guangdong Statistical Yearbook* (2005: 114), the *hukou* population was 1.8 million and documented migrants numbered 6.5 million, but the government “actually managed a total population of 12 millions” (*Xinjingbao*, August 8, 2005), which means there were more than 10 million migrants, including the documented and undocumented; see http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/zhengfu/2005-08/08/content_3324664.htm (accessed April 8, 2007).
69. See also Solinger, *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China*, 66–71.
70. According to the laws, participants in the social insurance can transfer their personal accounts at will. Our interviews with local officials confirmed it. However, migrant workers widely perceived that local governments often set up obstacles to transferring accounts.
71. Joppke, “How Immigration is Changing Citizenship: A Comparative View,” 629.
72. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class,” 38.
73. *Ibid.*, 20.
74. For this interpretation, see Hirschman, *The Rhetoric of Reaction*.
75. Marshall, “Citizenship and Social Class,” 20. Emphasis added.
76. During the Mao era, the concept of people (*renmin*) appeared to be better received than that of citizen (*gongmin*) for political reasons. See Xingzhong Yu, “Citizenship, Ideology, and the PRC Constitution,” in Merle Goldman and Elizabeth J. Perry, eds., *Changing Meanings of Citizenship in Modern China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 288–307.
77. Solinger, *Contesting Citizenship in Urban China*, 241.
78. The phenomenon of urban citizenship devaluation occurs because denizens are offered more or less comprehensive social welfare except political rights in the Western European context. Cf. Yasemin Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); and Joppke, “How Immigration Is Changing Citizenship.”
79. Chen Yingfang, “‘Nongmingong’: Zhidu Anpai yu Shenfen Rentong” 130.
80. Cf. Chen Yingfang, “‘Nongmingong’: Zhidu Anpai yu Shenfen Rentong,” 131.
81. Cf. Charles Tilly, *Durable Inequality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).
82. Quoted from a policy restatement by the State Council, “Several opinions regarding solving the problems of migrant peasant workers,” passed on January 18, 2006.
83. In the commune system the collective was supposed to provide minimal funds to the childless elderly to cover food, clothing, housing, medical care, and burial expenses.
84. For the concept of authoritarian resilience, see Andrew Nathan, “China’s Changing of the Guard: Authoritarian Resilience,” *Journal of Democracy* 14, no. 1 (January 2003): 6–17.
85. Figures generated from <http://reference.allrefer.com/country-guide-study/soviet-union/> (accessed March 1, 2006).

86. Figures compiled from *China Statistics Yearbook* 2004; Third National Population Census in 1982, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/t20020404_16769.htm (accessed March 1, 2006); and Sixth National Population Census in 2005, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjgb/rkpcgb/qgrkpcgb/t20020404_16769.htm (accessed March 1, 2006).
87. For the notion of “socialist serfdom,” see Martin Whyte’s introduction to this volume in Chapter 1.
88. Cf. Stephen Castles, “Nation and Empire: Hierarchies of Citizenship in the New Global Order,” *International Politics* 42, no. 2 (June, 2005): 203–224.
89. See the State Council, “Several opinions regarding solving the problems of migrant peasant workers” [Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiejue Nongmingong Wenti de Ruogan Yijian], approved by the Standing Committee of the State Council, January 18, 2006. http://big5.xinhuanet.com/gate/big5/news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2006-03/27/content_4351076.htm (accessed January 12, 2009).

4. How Large Is China’s Rural-Urban Income Gap?

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1. For estimates of China’s rural-urban income gap, see Dwayne Benjamin, Loren Brandt, John Giles, and Wang Sangui, “Income Inequality during China’s Economic Transition,” in Loren Brandt and Thomas G. Rawski, eds., *China’s Great Economic Transformation* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 729–775; John Knight and Lina Song, *The Urban-Rural Divide: Economic Disparities and Interactions in China* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); Shi Xinzhen, “Urban-Rural Income Differentials Decomposition in China 1990s,” M.A. Thesis, China Center for Economic Research, Peking University, Beijing, 2004; Dennis Tao Yang and Zhou Hao, “Rural-Urban Disparity and Sectoral Labor Allocation in China,” *Journal of Development Studies* 35, no. 3 (1999): 105–133; and X. B. Zhao and S. P. Tong, “Unequal Economic Development in China: Spatial Disparities and Regional Policy Reconsideration, 1985–1995,” *Regional Studies* 34, no. 6 (2000): 549–561.
2. For a discussion of income components and the measurement of income in China, see Azizur R. Khan and Carl Riskin, “Growth and Distribution of Household Income in China between 1995 and 2002,” in Björn Gustafsson, Li Shi, and Terry Sicular, eds., *Inequality and Public Policy in China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 61–87.